Supreme Court Strikes Down CA Law Compelling Pro-Abortion Speech from Pro-Lifers

Today, the Supreme Court decided National Institute of Family and Life Associates (NIFLA) v. Becerra.  Justice Thomas wrote for the five-member majority concerning the two pro-abortion notices required of pro-life pregnancy center by the California law at issue (the FACT Act) (citations omitted):

The licensed notice is a content-based regulation of speech. By compelling individuals to speak a particular message, such notices “alte[r] the content of [their] speech.” . . . Although the licensed notice is content based, the Ninth Circuit did not apply strict scrutiny because it concluded that the notice regulates “professional speech.” Some Courts of Appeals have recognized “professional speech” as a separate category of speech that is subject to different rules. . . . But this Court has not recognized “professional speech” as a separate category of speech. Speech is not unprotected merely because it is uttered by “professionals.” . . . 

The dangers associated with content-based regulations of speech are also present in the context of professional speech. As with other kinds of speech, regulating the content of professionals’ speech “pose[s] the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information.” . . . “[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” and the people lose when the government is the one deciding which ideas should prevail. . . . 

In sum, neither California nor the Ninth Circuit has identified a persuasive reason for treating professional speech as a unique category that is exempt from ordinary First Amendment principles. We do not foreclose the possibility that some such reason exists. We need not do so because the licensed notice cannot survive even intermediate scrutiny. California asserts a single interest to justify the licensed notice: providing low-income women with information about state-sponsored services. Assuming that this is a substantial state interest, the licensed notice is not sufficiently drawn to achieve it. 

If California’s goal is to educate low-income women about the services it provides, then the licensed notice is “wildly under inclusive.” . . . Yet “[p]recision . . . must be the touchstone” when it comes to regulations of speech, which “so closely touc[h] our most precious freedoms.” . . . 

Turning to the other notice requirement: 

We need not decide what type of state interest is sufficient to sustain a disclosure requirement like the unlicensed notice. California has not demonstrated any justification for the unlicensed notice that is more than “purely hypothetical.” . . . 

Even if California had presented a nonhypothetical justification for the unlicensed notice, the FACT Act unduly burdens protected speech. The unlicensed notice imposes a government-scripted, speaker-based disclosure requirement that is wholly disconnected from California’s informational interest. . . . And it covers a curiously narrow subset of speakers. . . . This Court’s precedents are deeply skeptical of laws that “distinguis[h] among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.” Speaker-based laws run the risk that “the State has left unburdened those speakers whose messages are in accord with its own views.” 

The majority did not reach the plaintiffs' viewpoint discrimination claim (see footnote 2 on page 6).  Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito and Gorsuch, agreed that the Court was correct not to reach the viewpoint discrimination question but concurred to note that the "apparent viewpoint discrimination here is a matter of serious constitutional concern":  

It does appear that viewpoint discrimination is inherent in the design and structure of this Act. This law is a paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when government seeks to impose its own message in the place of individual speech, thought, and expression. . . . This compels individuals to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, or all of these. And the history of the Act’s passage and its underinclusive application suggest a real possibility that these individuals were targeted because of their beliefs. . . . 

Governments must not be allowed to force persons to express a message contrary to their deepest convictions. Freedom of speech secures freedom of thought and belief. This law imperils those liberties. 

While liberals will use any means to attempt to force people to support their policy agenda, the First Amendment stands against government efforts to force people to speak contrary to their personal views just as it stands against restricting people from speaking.  Today the Supreme Court once again relied on the First Amendment to vindicate the rights of the people against government oppression. 

The Supreme Court also upheld President Trump's so-called "travel ban" today in Trump v. Hawaii.  

The Court's last decision day for this term is tomorrow.  The decision in Janus v. AFSCME (concerning compelled union dues for government employees) is expected, and if any justices are retiring, it will likely be announced tomorrow.  Follow the RNLA on Twitter for news tomorrow morning.

Oral Argument Highlights from Janus v. AFSCME

Today, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Janus v. AFSCME, a First Amendment challenge to an Illinois statute requiring non-union members to pay mandatory union dues to the union deemed to represent the non-members' interests in collective bargaining activities. 

RNLA Advisory Council member Robert Alt described an irony at the heart of this compelled speech case:

What is surprising is the fact that Mark Janus is personally funding a cadre of high-priced lawyers with one goal: making sure that Mark loses his case. Why would he pay for the lawyers arguing against him? Because he has no choice. Mark is required to pay agency fees to the union, which are used for chargeable expenses like litigation, or he can be fired. And, of course, he is required to pay for political collective bargaining speech, or he can be fired. 

This is the real story of the money behind the Janus case—a story of forced contributions for political speech. But the story could have a happy ending. The Supreme Court will hear arguments today in a case that could vindicate the First Amendment rights of millions of Americans like Mark Janus. For Rebecca Friedrichs, for Mark Janus, and for all the workers who are being denied a voice and a choice, let’s hope that the second time is the charm.

Mr. Alt referenced Rebecca Friedrichs, the challenger in the 2016 case that raised the same issue and on which the Supreme Court deadlocked after Justice Scalia passed away a few weeks after oral arguments.  

RNLA member Ray LaJeunesse, Jr., summarized the history of compulsory union fees cases at the Supreme Court and gave some highlights of today's oral argument in a Federalist Society teleforum this afternoon:

• Ruling for Janus requires overturning Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, where Justice Powell concurred in the judgment but identified two flaws in the majority opinion that are at heart of Janus argument.
• Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson required that employees must be given adequate advanced notice of fees and basis.
• Knox v. SEIU (2012) – SEIU local imposed special assessment to oppose two ballot measures after Hudson notice sent; Supreme Court held additional notice must be sent and no fee could be imposed on non-members without their consent; compulsory subsidies for private speech are subject to exacting scrutiny; free-rider arguments insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.
• Harris v. Quinn (2014) – majority refused to extend Abood because analysis was questionable on 6 grounds.
• Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association (2016) – directly presented question of whether Abood should be overruled and it was expected to be before Justice Scalia passed away; same question presented as in Janus.
• In Citizens United, Court held it does not hesitate to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment.  
• Assuming monopoly bargaining is a compelling government interest, forced agency fees are not required to achieve that interest as such bargaining occurs at the federal level and in right to work states without forced fees.  Respondents argued that forced fees are not subject to heightened scrutiny.
• There were competing demonstrations outside the Supreme Court.  It was the longest line of attorneys Mr. LaJeunesse had ever seen to get in to a case - over 100 in line and he was number 77 in the overflow room.
• National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation attorney Bill Messenger, arguing for Mr. Janus, was 42 seconds into his argument before Justice Ginsburg asked the first question, about mandatory student fees, bar fees, and private-sector unions.  Court in Harris distinguished all those scenarios (imposed for university’s interest in neutral forum for exchange of ideas, governmental regulation of practice of law, and private-sector bargaining is not political like public-sector bargaining).
• Justice Breyer asked about stare decisis, private-sector bargaining distinction, and Prof. Charles Fried's amicus brief that proposed compromise of different test for what is chargeable in public sector (charge only for union's statutory duties); Justice Alito pointed out compromise was not a solution because legislature could make union monopoly for purposes of lobbying, which California already has done.
• Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that monopoly bargaining works without force fees at the federal government and postal service.  Justice Kagan asked how many times Trump Admin has switched its position at Supreme Court in this and other cases; he said 3 times (had faced question in other cases and appeared prepared for it).
• Illinois Solicitor General David Franklin was questioned closely by Justices Alito and Kennedy, both or whom clearly still ascribe to their opinion in Harris.  Justice Roberts asked whether it would make unions more responsive if they had to attract voluntary support (indicates his continued support for Harris opinion as well).  Justice Breyer brought up Prof. Fried's potential compromise again.
• Appellate lawyer David Frederick argued for the union and was again questioned closely by Justices Alito and Kennedy.  Justice Kennedy asked if this case would affect the political influence of unions if the Court rules for Janus, Frederick said “yes,” and Kennedy said, isn’t that the end of the case?  Justice Roberts asked how union negotiations over a collective bargaining agreement not affect state budget?  Mr. Frederick answered that they do.
• Mr. Frederick said there is real reliance here because there is a trade-off of agreeing not to strike in the collective bargaining agreement.  Mr. Messenger in rebuttal said that in other words, the scheme is racket protection, paying the union to ensure lack of uprising against the government and that grievance processing to enforce public policy according to the collective bargaining agreement is as much advocacy as making the agreement.
• Throughout the arguments, Justices Breyer and Kennedy were most active questioners.  Notably, Justice Gorsuch did not ask any questions.

The oral argument transcript is here.  While this case may be released at the end of the term like many other important cases are, Mr. LaJeunesse noted that opinions may have already been drafted and circulated for the Friedrichs case and the lines for all of the justices except Justice Gorsuch were already drawn in Harris, which might expedite the release of the decision.  This case will have serious implications for the free speech rights of public employees and their importance constitutional right against compelled speech.

Three Upcoming Free Speech Cases at the Supreme Court

Today, The Heritage Foundation hosted a panel on three important, upcoming free speech cases at the Supreme Court.  Key points from the attorneys representing the challengers are below.  The entire presentation is fascinating and can be viewed here (starting at 14:50).

First, Jacob Huebert of the Liberty Justice Center discussed Janus v. AFSCME, a challenge to Illinois compulsory union dues for non-members, which will be heard February 26:

• The key question in Janus is can the government force its employees to give money to a union just to keep their jobs?  Illinois is one of 22 states that allow unions to take dues from every worker even if he or she is not a member of the union.
• Janus argues that these laws violate right to choose which political speech to support and which groups to associate with.

• Janus lost in lower court because of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, where Supreme Court skipped the First Amendment analysis and did not require a showing of compelling government interest.  The compulsory dues in Abood were justified by the government interest in labor peace to avoid free riders (non-members gaining from unions' collective bargaining efforts), but the Court decided that unions cannot make workers pay for electioneering activity because association for political purposes is at heart of the First Amendment.  Because of this, a two-tier dues structure exists for union members who do not wish to support the unions' electioneering.
• Abood is wrong because: 1) public unions’ activity is essentially political – discussions with the government about pay, etc., and 2) the free-rider justification is false – not everyone benefits from the collective bargaining and it could even be a harm if a person would prefer to be judged on individual merits.  Janus objects to the spending and tax increases supported by the union.  This argument assumes that every worker only cares about his own narrow monetary self-interest.
• The challengers are optimistic that the court is willing to overrule Abood because of the rulings in Harris v. Quinn and Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association and hope the Court will say clearly that when you take a government job, you do not have to check your First Amendment rights at the door.

Second, Todd Gaziano of the Pacific Legal Foundation discussed Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, a challenge of Minnesota's prohibition of political apparel at the polls, which will be heard February 28 (and which we have covered before):

• The Minnesota law's “breathtaking scope” is the primary reason it is unconstitutional.
• Poll worker instruction said the law prohibits wearing clothing promoting a group with recognizable political views such as the Tea Party or MoveOn.org.
• Andy Cilek, MVA's President, was twice prevented from voting because he was wearing a Gadsden Flag t-shirt. The third time he was allowed to vote but poll workers said they were taking down his name to pass along to law enforcement and authorities for possible prosecution.
• The state’s justification is preventing intimidation and confusion.
• Supreme Court has upheld bans on active campaigning.  That is not at issue here.
• If clothing is actually intimidating, that would already be prohibited by separate statutes.  Law was substantially overbroad vs. the dangerous speech it was trying to prevent.
• The state is now trying to reinterpret the law, but statute on its face is broad, reaching anything political. 
• Almost anything can be considered political – religious messages, military messages, etc.
• The problem is in application - different poll workers will apply statue differently, resulting in viewpoint discrimination and selective application.
• The state admitted during litigation that there were especially broad applications of the law – Minnesota Vikings shirt, AFL-CIO shirt, and Chamber of Commerce logo on a shirt – all were political.
• The state claims it needs the law to promote peace at the polls and prevent silent intimidation.  Supreme Court found that unfounded fears of disruption are not a basis for a broad prohibition on speech (Vietnam armband case - Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District).

Finally, Jordan Lorence of Alliance Defending Freedom discussed National Institute of Family and Life Advocates (NIFLA) v. Becerra, a challenge to California's compelled disclosure law for pro-life pregnancy centers, which will be heard March 20:

• The law requires licensed pro-life facilities (which offer ultrasounds) to post a sign saying California has public programs providing free contraception and abortion for eligible women, compelling them to speak in a way they find unconscionable.  It requires unlicensed facilities (that offer assistance services) to post a sign saying it is unlicensed with no medical provider supervising its activities.
• Law is written to apply to only those with an ideological objection to abortion by exempting non-OB/GYN medical providers and all who participate in the government's program to provide or refer women to an abortion.
• The state could use all sorts of communication channels if it thinks that women are insufficiently informed about their options for an abortion, but the only one it does is requiring pro-life pregnancy centers to convey its message.
• “Raw display of governmental coercion” to force pro-life pregnancy centers to promote abortion.
• Viewpoint and content-based discriminatory, only required of pro-life pregnancy centers – regular doctors and OB/GYNs do not have to post signs.
• State’s justification (without evidence) is that centers are tricking women into thinking that they are abortion clinics.
• State also says it is commercial speech, but no commercial transaction is taking place – services for free offered on an ideological basis.
• It maybe could be justified on a medical disclosure/informed consent basis, but that is not state’s position or action – trying to entice women into a surgical procedure, not warn about its potential harms.  
• West Virginia v. Barnett – Supreme Court struck down compulsory pledge of allegiance law during World War II, famously saying: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us."
• The lower court said that the law was permissible because it regulated a profession, which is not a recognized category of exemption from the First Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit used its own lower standard of scrutiny instead of the strict scrutiny mandated by the Supreme Court in Town of Gilbert.

Jordan Lorence also summarized what the three cases have in common.  The common thread is that Founders understood human tendency to misuse governmental power of coercion to censor those opposing the prevailing orthodoxy or force people to support prevailing orthodoxy at the time, and they passed the First Amendment to prevent that.  MVA v. Mansky is about straight censorship, Janus is about compelled speech via funding, and NIFLA is about compelled speech.  

All of these cases will have serious implications for all Americans' rights not to be forced to speak or prevented from speaking by the government.  All three advocates were optimistic that the Supreme Court will rule in their clients' favor, strike down these laws, and protect free speech rights.

Free Speech v. Union Dues: The Right Not to Pay Union Dues - SCOTUS to Decide

Looking forward to next year, the Supreme Court will be hearing arguments on a free speech case at the end of February. The case seems simple: can unions force a non-member to pay dues when the non-member disagrees and does not support what the union espouses? However, it is pitting two giants of American society against one another in a novel way.

Terry Pell penned a guest post on SCOTUS Blog delving into this case: Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31. Mr. Pell summarizes the background of the case as follows:

For many years, Mark Janus has been a child-support specialist in the Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services. Today he is the named plaintiff in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, a case that could well end laws in 22 states that require public employees to pay “agency fees” to a union regardless of whether they are members of the union or wish to support it. Janus’ case is perched on the tip of a spear aimed directly at the funding mechanism that has generously supported public-employee unions for the last 40 years. 

Janus’ claim is straightforward: His union is one of several public-employee unions pressing the state of Illinois for greater salaries and pension benefits for public employees. Janus thinks the union’s efforts are pushing the state toward greater borrowing, higher taxes and possible bankruptcy. All of this, he says, will harm future generations, including his own children and grandchildren. So he quit his union. Nevertheless, Illinois state law requires that he pay “agency fees” to his union to compensate it for its expenses in negotiating a contract on his behalf. Even though Janus doesn’t agree with the union’s efforts to secure greater salary and a bigger pension, he personally benefits from those efforts. Not unreasonably, the union thinks he should pay his “fair share” of what it costs to negotiate that contract. 

So, at issue, is whether the First Amendment right to free expression--here the right to not financially support unions--can be eclipsed by unions seeking compensation for benefits conveyed even to non-union members? The Plaintiff disagrees:

But Janus argues that he has the right under the First Amendment to decide for himself whether greater salary and more benefits are good things. If so, the First Amendment protects his right no matter how unpopular with the union or out of step with his fellow public employees...This is an unusual case. But the conflict between the free speech rights of individuals and the demands of the modern workplace is real. On the one hand, it seems correct that a public employer can restrict the right of its employees to promote their personal political views on the job. But it seems equally obvious that a public employer cannot force its employees to personally fund organizations with which they have deep political disagreements. 

Supreme Court precedents might shed insights on this issue. First, the Plaintiff will argue the wide and broad breadth of the First Amendment:

But the Supreme Court has recognized that if the First Amendment protects the right of individuals to speak their minds, then it must also protect the right of individuals to refrain from speaking, to decide for themselves whether and when to participate in public discussion... First Amendment secures for the individual a “sphere of intellect and spirit” free “from all official control,” the Supreme Court held in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. As the court memorably put it in Barnette, if the First Amendment “guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind,” it surely does not allow officials “to compel him to utter what is not in his mind.”

Conversely, the Defendant-union will argue the potential loss of membership and resources:

How many union members will leave if the Supreme Court does away with compulsory dues? If it is a great number, then states like Illinois could argue that there is a compelling government interest in preserving compulsory dues in order to support the system of collective bargaining necessary to managing a public workforce... But not many may leave, at least according to evidence the unions offered in Yohn v. California Teachers Association (a case in which my firm is serving as co-counsel). The plaintiff teachers in Yohn asked the unions whether loss of compulsory dues would make them insolvent or preclude them from serving effectively as exclusive bargaining representatives... In response, the unions said that “some number” of workers will refuse to pay dues and that this number “may be substantial.” They did not attempt to quantify the number who might leave or suggest that the loss of those workers’ dues would impede the unions from effectively representing employees.

This case will surely be a pivotal case for the 2017 Term--both for unions as well as proponents of the First Amendment. Oral arguments are scheduled for February 28th. You can view the briefs and filings on SCOTUS Blog, available by link here.

Free Speech for All: Unless You Are Talking About the Left, Then They Sue!

Everyone agrees that free speech is a great thing--unless someone is calling out a leftist group for their behavior; in those cases, the left views such speech as unacceptable, intolerable, and might even end up filing a lawsuit (or three) against you just for expressing your views and opinions.

This situation is unfolding prominently the State of Washington. The Washington Examiner has recently reported this story. The SEIU v. Freedom Foundation:

Did you know that just telling union members about their rights under federal law can bring misery down on your head? Just ask the Freedom Foundation, a state think tank based in Olympia, Wash[ington], which has recently suffered outrageously aggressive legal harassment from the Service Employees International Union. The SEIU has ginned up three separate lawsuits against the Freedom Foundation and also persuaded the state's attorney general to sue the think tank. At issue: the Freedom Foundation's effort to talk to more than 50,000 people dragooned into becoming SEIU members about their legal right to opt out.

These particular members ended up owing dues to the SEIU because of a dodgy scam the union pulled off with the help of friendly politicians to skim from the benefits paid out to indigent home care patients. The "members" in question didn't ask to join the SEIU; they're simply Washingtonians who receive state Medicaid payments to care for disabled loved ones — an ailing parent, say, or a handicapped child, who would otherwise require more expensive institutional care. . . . As has happened in several other Democrat-controlled states, the union got the governor to invent a shell corporation that supposedly "employs" persons receiving such Medicaid payments. Then, the state had a mail-in "election" on unionization of these home care workers, in which very few benefit-recipients even realized what was happening. . . .

The Freedom Foundation estimates the state SEIU skims something like $25 million a year through this scheme. The same outrage occurs in other states, and the injustice led the U.S. Supreme Court (in its 2014 decision Harris v. Quinn) to hold that individual home care providers in this situation cannot be forced to join or pay a union. "The First Amendment," the court declared, "prohibits the collection of an agency fee from the plaintiffs in the case, home healthcare providers who do not wish to join or support a union.". . .

In an attempt to call SEIU out on this, Freedom Foundation launched a campaign to reach out to several "members" to notify them of their rights and ability to opt-out:

The SEIU hasn't taken kindly to this. Last September, the union and its affiliates filed three lawsuits against the Freedom Foundation. They even hired three separate law firms for the barrage of suits, inundating the foundation with intimidating subpoenas, depositions and discovery demands. The SEIU even convinced Washington State attorney general Bob Ferguson to file lawsuits against the Foundation. . . The Freedom Foundation filed a counterclaim against the SEIU for "abuse of process". . . .

The Court appointed a "Special Discovery Master," who recently handed down a potentially damning ruling to SEIU's case. Recently, he ruled in the initial stages of the case: "I do not find that SEIU has demonstrated that the Freedom Foundation has wrongfully communicated with SEIU members or used SEIU's confidential information to harass SEIU members or employees. The Freedom Foundation is entitled to contact SEIU members, and prior restraint of its efforts to do so is impermissible."

While free speech has won this initial hurdle, a greater contest is potentially on the horizon. Censorship of ideas and expression is not how this country was formed. Ideas and principles should be freely debated, not held hostage to threats of retribution.

Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Assn.: Important Free Speech Case

On Monday, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, considering whether the First Amendment allows non-member public employees to be required to pay compulsory union fees.  

Under current law, public-sector unions can charge non-member public employees fees for the union's collective bargaining activities but must allow them to opt out of fees for the union's lobbying or political activities.  Many argue unions' bargaining activities are inherently lobbying and political, as they are seeking access to taxpayer funds and to influence public policy.  

Terry Pell, Counsel to Petitioner Rebecca Friedrichs, explained the case's importance for free speech rights:

[I]t is not the business of the government to trim the First Amendment rights of citizens to make it easier for unions to maximize their dues revenue. The First Amendment is clear — the government may not coerce speech, especially core political speech of the sort that is the bread and butter of public employee unions. Rebecca Friedrichs and thousands of other public employees are hopeful the Supreme Court will restore their constitutional right to decide for themselves what speech to support. 

Even if the Supreme Court strikes down the compulsory fees system, public unions will still enjoy large memberships, according to the Mackinac Center for Public Policy's F. Vincent Vernuccio: “The sky is not going to fall. As we’ve seen in right-to-work states across the country, union members who see the value in their unions continue to support it.”

The Democratic Party's Persistent Voter Suppression

The Democratic Party has recently taken to using cries of voter suppression as an attack against Republican elected officials, candidates, and policies. From limits on early voting to voter ID, Democrats are quick to levy the charge of voter suppression, but a professor from UC-Berkely recently held up a mirror to the country's left-wing and revealed an ugly reality.

From 2001 to 2011, Democrats have been responsible for a massive suppression of voter turnout through their opposition to consolidated election cycles. It is a well-known fact that off-year elections yield the lowest voter turnout. What many not realize is that there are other, more sporadic election cycles in the country as opposed to just odd-year voting in November. In New Jersey, for example, state elections are held in November of odd years while school district elections are held in April and fire district commissioners are elected in February.

Professor Anzia asked a nationally representative sample of Americans if they prefer elections to be held at different times for different office "because it allows voters to focus on a shorter list of candidates and issues" or consolidated elections "because combining the elections boosts voter turnout for local elections." Voters responded with a clear preference for consolidated elections.

So, given this obvious preference, why isn't there a push to move toward these consolidated elections cycles? Well, from 2001 to 2011 there were approximately 200 bills put forward nationwide to cut down on the number of separate elections and ease the burden on voters. Of these bills only 25 became law. Most interestingly, a majority of the bills were sponsored by Republicans and failed because of Democratic opposition at the urging of Democratic-aligned interest groups, including teachers unions and municipal employee organizations.

Why? Because Democrats know that the voters who turnout in off-year elections tend to have a special interest in the issues or candidates on the ballot. These Democratic groups crave low voter-turnout because they know they will be able to get their members to the polls and that their vote will have a disproportionate impact in favor the groups' liberal agenda.

So while the Democrats are happy to champion voter-rights when it serves as a useful, albeit dishonest, attack on Republicans, it seems they are less inclined to do so when it stands in the way of their policy objectives.