Supreme Court Upholds TX Congressional District Lines for All Except One District

Today, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Abbott v. Perez, a racial gerrymandering challenge out of Texas.  The Court held that the lower court had used an improper intent analysis to invalidate congressional and state house district maps, that the lower court had improperly applied the “effects” test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to invalidate three districts, and that the fourth challenged district was an impermissible racial gerrymander because the state did not prove narrow tailoring in its use of race.

Justice Alito wrote for the five-justice majority, noting that district map challengers bear the burden of showing discriminatory intent (citations omitted):

We now hold that the three-judge court committed a fundamental legal error. It was the challengers’ burden to show that the 2013 Legislature acted with discriminatory intent when it enacted plans that the court itself had produced. The 2013 Legislature was not obligated to show that it had “cured” the unlawful intent that the court attributed to the 2011 Legislature. Thus, the essential pillar of the three-judge court’s reasoning was critically flawed. . . . 

The court refused to accept this conclusion, but its reasons for doing so cannot stand up. As an initial matter, the court thought that the two districts would have to be redrawn based on its finding regarding the intent of the 2013 Legislature, and it therefore deferred a final decision on the §2 issue and advised the plaintiffs to consider at the remedial phase of the case whether they preferred to have two districts that might not perform or just one safe district. The court’s decision cannot be sustained on this ground, since its finding of discriminatory intent is erroneous. 

The only other reason provided by the court was the observation that [Mexican-American Legal Caucus] “failed to show” that two majority-Latino districts in Nueces County would not perform. This observation twisted the burden of proof beyond recognition. It suggested that a plaintiff might succeed on its §2 claim because its expert failed to show that the necessary factual basis for the claim could not be established. Courts cannot find §2 effects violations on the basis of uncertainty. In any event, if even the District Court remains unsure how to draw these districts to comply with §2 (after six years of litigation, almost a dozen trials, and numerous opinions), the Legislature surely had the “ ‘broad discretion’ ” to comply as it reasonably saw fit in 2013.

With regard to the invalidated district (citations omitted):

By contrast, where we have accepted a State’s “good reasons” for using race in drawing district lines, the State made a strong showing of a pre-enactment analysis with justifiable conclusions. In Bethune-Hill, the State established that the primary map drawer “discussed the district with incumbents from other majority-minority districts[,]. . . considered turnout rates, the results of the recent contested primary and general elections,” and the district’s large prison population.  The State established that it had performed a “functional analysis,” and acted to achieve an “informed bipartisan consensus.” Texas’s showing here is not equivalent.

Perhaps Texas could have made a stronger showing, but it is the State’s burden to prove narrow tailoring, and it did not do so on the record before us. We hold that HD90 is an impermissible racial gerrymander. On remand, the District Court will have to consider what if any remedy is appropriate at this time. 

Also worth noting, the Court found that though the lower court did not label its order as an injunction, it functioned as an injunction and the lower court could not avoid review under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 by labeling the order something other than an injunction.

Justice Thomas has been alone in saying that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act cannot justify using race in redistricting and that therefore requiring legislatures to form majority-minority districts by considering race is impermissible.  But today, Justice Gorsuch joined his concurrence in Abbott reiterating that stance, which may prove very important in future racial gerrymandering cases at the Supreme Court.

The Court also vacated and remanded Rucho v. Common Cause, a partisan gerrymandering challenge out of North Carolina that many liberals are hoping will meet the standing requirements of Gill v. Whitford, back to the district court for further proceedings in light of Gill.

While it may seem that little was decided today, the Court's reiteration of the appropriate burden of proof in redistricting cases is vital to courts consistently deciding redistricting cases according to actual legal principles.

Supreme Court Upholds Ohio Voter Registration List Maintenance Procedure

This morning, the Supreme Court decided Husted v. Philip Randolph Institute, overturning 5 to 4 the Sixth Circuit decision that invalidated one of Ohio's voter registration list maintenance procedures.  Justice Alito wrote for the Court, starting by clearing stating the facts at issue, which have been politicized into slogans like "Ohio's voter purge" by the left throughout this case:

At issue in today’s case is an Ohio law that aims to keep the State’s voting lists up to date by removing the names of those who have moved out of the district where they are registered. Ohio uses the failure to vote for two years as a rough way of identifying voters who may have moved, and it then sends a preaddressed, postage prepaid card to these individuals asking them to verify that they still reside at the same address. Voters who do not return this card and fail to vote in any election for four more years are presumed to have moved and are removed from the rolls. We are asked to decide whether this program complies with federal law.

The Court found that Ohio's practice is in compliance with the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) (internal citations omitted): 

Respondents argue (and the Sixth Circuit held) that, even if Ohio’s process complies with subsection (d), it nevertheless violates the Failure-to-Vote Clause—the clause that generally prohibits States from removing people from the rolls “by reason of [a] person’s failure to vote.” Respondents point out that Ohio’s Supplemental Process uses a person’s failure to vote twice: once as the trigger for sending return cards and again as one of the requirements for removal. Respondents conclude that this use of nonvoting is illegal.  

We reject this argument because the Failure-to-Vote Clause, both as originally enacted in the NVRA and as amended by HAVA, simply forbids the use of nonvoting as the sole criterion for removing a registrant, and Ohio does not use it that way. Instead, as permitted by subsection (d), Ohio removes registrants only if they have failed to vote and have failed to respond to a notice.

While the decision is largely one of statutory construction, it is also one that respects the proper role of the court and defers to the lawful policy judgments made by legislatures (internal citations omitted):

Requiring additional evidence not only second-guesses the congressional judgment embodied in subsection (d)’s removal process, but it also second-guesses the judgment of the Ohio Legislature as expressed in the State’s Supplemental Process. The Constitution gives States the authority to set the qualifications for voting in congressional elections,  as well as the authority to set the “Times, Places and Manner” to conduct such elections in the absence of contrary congressional direction. We have no authority to dismiss the considered judgment of Congress and the Ohio Legislature regarding the probative value of a registrant’s failure to send back a return card. . . .

It is not our prerogative to judge the reasonableness of that congressional judgment . . . . The dissents have a policy disagreement, not just with Ohio, but with Congress. But this case presents a question of statutory interpretation, not a question of policy. We have no authority to second-guess Congress or to decide whether Ohio’s Supplemental Process is the ideal method for keeping its voting rolls up to date. The only question before us is whether it violates federal law. It does not.

Justice Thomas wrote a concurrence to raise constitutional concerns with the respondents' view of the NVRA (internal citations omitted):

I join the Court’s opinion in full.  I write separately to add that respondents’ proposed interpretation of the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA) should also be rejected because it would raise significant constitutional concerns. . . . As I have previously explained, constitutional text and history both “confirm that States have the exclusive authority to set voter qualifications and to determine whether those qualifications are satisfied.” . . . Respondents’ reading of the NVRA would seriously interfere with the States’ constitutional authority to set and enforce voter qualifications.

While the left will hyperbolically decry this decision as promoting voter suppression, Ohio's process has many protections to prevent voters who still live in the state and wish to remain on the voter registration rolls from being removed.  That is why the Court correctly upheld the practice under the NVRA.  As Justice Alito noted, difficult policy judgments about the best ways to administer elections, protect the integrity of elections, and ensure that every eligible voter is able to vote should be made by legislatures, not by unelected judges.

Supreme Court Issues Opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop First Amendment Case

This morning, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.  Based on his religious beliefs, Colorado baker Jack Phillips refused to create a cake for a same-sex wedding in 2012, and the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a state Administrative Law Judge, and the Colorado Court of Appeals all found that Phillips had violated the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.

Today, the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Kennedy, held 7-2 that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission acted with "clear and impermissible hostility" toward Phillips' sincerely held religious beliefs (partially from the syllabus; internal citations omitted):

As the record shows, some of the commissioners at the Commission’s formal, public hearings endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, disparaged Phillips’ faith as despicable and characterized it as merely rhetorical, and compared his invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. No commissioners objected to the comments. Nor were they mentioned in the later state-court ruling or disavowed in the briefs filed here. The comments thus cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case.  

Another indication of hostility is the different treatment of Phillips’ case and the cases of other bakers with objections to anti-gay messages who prevailed before the Commission. The Commission ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message on the requested wedding cake would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the cases involving requests for cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism. The Division also considered that each bakery was willing to sell other products to the prospective customers, but the Commission found Phillips’ willingness to do the same irrelevant. The State Court of Appeals’ brief discussion of this disparity of treatment does not answer Phillips’ concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection. 

For these reasons, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case violated the State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint. The government, consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. . . . [T]he record here demonstrates that the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ case was neither tolerant nor respectful of his religious beliefs. . . . 

The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, considered, and decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be different going forward in the respects noted above. However later cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission’s order must be invalidated. 

Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, wrote a concurrence because the Colorado Court of Appeals' "reasoning flouts bedrock principles of our free-speech jurisprudence and would justify virtually any law that compels individuals to speak."  Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Alito, wrote separately to respond to Justices Ginsburg and Kagan's attempts to defend the Commission's actions (internal citations omitted): "In the face of so much evidence suggesting hostility toward Mr. Phillips’s sincerely held religious beliefs, two of our colleagues have written separately to suggest that the Commission acted neutrally toward his faith when it treated him differently from the other bakers—or that it could have easily done so consistent with the First Amendment. But, respectfully, I do not see how we might rescue the Commission from its error."

Whatever one's view of the background social policy debate over same-sex marriage, what happened to Jack Phillips should strike fear into the heart of every liberty-loving person who respects the rule of law.  An unelected government commission pre-judged his case according to the commissioners' own beliefs without regard for his constitutional rights.  (As a side note, this "bipartisan" commission is currently composed of four Democrats, one Republican, and two independents.  Given their outright "hostility" to Mr. Phillips, one can only imagine how fairly they evaluate Republicans that come before them.)  The Supreme Court righted this wrong today.

Supreme Court Hears Oral Arguments in Benisek v. Lamone, Maryland Redistricting Case

This morning, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Benisek v. Lamone, a First Amendment retaliation challenge to Maryland's 6th Congressional district lines.  This is the second partisan gerrymandering case the Court has heard this term, after Gill v. Whitford in October.  

The facts and arguments in Benisek are unique from those in Whitford, though both are partisan gerrymandering claims:

For two decades, the predominantly Republican district was represented in Congress by Republican Roscoe Bartlett, but in 2011, redistricting altered the political composition of the 6th district; the following year, Democrat John Delaney beat Bartlett by over 20 percentage points. The plaintiffs in the case live in the 6th district and contend that Democrats in Maryland engaged in partisan gerrymandering – that is, drawing a redistricting map to favor one political party at the expense of another – to retaliate against them for their past support of Republican candidates like Bartlett. And that, they argue, violated their First Amendment rights of speech and association. Maryland officials deny that any gerrymandering occurred. But even if it did, they maintain, courts should stay out of these kinds of First Amendment retaliation claims because there are no manageable standards for them to use to determine when partisan gerrymandering goes too far.

The Court has refrained from ruling on partisan gerrymandering cases in the past, and it is unclear how the Justices will rule on this set of cases:

If spectators had hoped that today’s oral argument might shed some light on how the justices had voted on the Wisconsin case, they were – unless the justices have excellent poker faces – largely disappointed. Instead, it seemed entirely possible that the justices were counting on the oral argument to give them new insight into a solution to the thorny problem of partisan gerrymandering. But before they even got that far, justices of all ideological stripes expressed doubt about whether they should rule on the partisan-gerrymandering question at all when the case came to them as a request for preliminary relief, rather than for a decision on the merits, and their ruling would come too late for any changes to the state’s congressional maps before the upcoming 2018 election. . . . 

When the justices did eventually turn to the question of partisan gerrymandering itself, the concern at the heart of the Wisconsin case resurfaced: How should courts evaluate claims of partisan gerrymandering? As Justice Samuel Alito stressed to Kimberly, the Supreme Court has recognized that redistricting is an inherently partisan process, and that a desire to give the party in power an advantage is not, standing alone, problematic. 

Moreover, there was no obvious consensus among the justices on how courts should determine when politics has played too strong a role in redistricting. . . . 

As RNLA Executive Director Michael Thielen wrote last week, courts are not the proper venue for resolving the political disputes inherent in redistricting.  But since it is unlikely that courts will re-invoke the political question doctrine and no longer decide redistricting cases, everyone on all sides of this issue agrees that the Court needs to provide clear guidance to prevent courts from acting arbitrarily when deciding redistricting cases.

PA Legislators Ask Supreme Court to Stay Usurpation of Redistricting by PA Supreme Court

On Tuesday, Pennsylvania Speaker of the House Michael Turzai and Senate President Pro Tempore Joseph Scarnati filed an emergency application with Justice Samuel Alito to stay the imposition of a new congressional map by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court pending resolution of the case by the entire U.S. Supreme Court.  Counsel to the Pennsylvania legislators include RNLA members Jason Torchinsky and Phillip Gordon of Holtzman Vogel Josefiak Torchinsky PLLC and Mark Braden of Baker & Hostetler LLP.  

They described the intentional usurpations of the political process by the Democrat-controlled Pennsylvania Supreme Court (internal citations and notes omitted):

This case arises from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s usurpation of the Pennsylvania General Assembly’s legislative authority to draw its congressional district lines through its preordained invalidation of the lawful districts the General Assembly enacted in 2011 (the “2011 Plan”). At all stages, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court set this case on a path whereby only it would draw Pennsylvania’s new congressional districts—a task delegated to the “Legislature”—in violation of the Elections Clause. But as Justice Kennedy stated in League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, “drawing lines for congressional districts is one of the most significant acts a State can perform to ensure citizen participation in republican self-governance. * * * As the Constitution vests redistricting responsibilities foremost in the legislatures of the States and in Congress, a lawful, legislatively enacted plan should be preferable to one drawn by the courts.” . . . The Pennsylvania Supreme Court conspicuously seized the redistricting process and prevented any meaningful ability for the legislature to enact a remedial map to ensure a court drawn map.  

First, on January 22, 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an order enjoining the 2011 Plan because it failed to comply with purported mandatory requirements found nowhere in the Pennsylvania Constitution . . . . Second, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided an inadequate remedial opportunity to the General Assembly, thus ensuring a court drawn map. It did not issue an opinion with its initial order and did not provide its sufficient guidance on how a new map could be drawn in compliance with the Pennsylvania Constitution. It nevertheless gave the General Assembly a mere 18 days, until February 9, to enact new legislation before the Court would impose a plan of its own, and even reserved the right to review the enacted map. Indeed, that was the court’s intention all along. It proceeded to hire a political scientist to prepare for a judicial, rather than a legislative, redistricting. . . . 

. . . [T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s intentional seizure of the redistricting process is now complete. On February 7—just two days before the deadline that the Court imposed to enact a new plan—the Pennsylvania Supreme Court issued an opinion . . . . The General Assembly’s leadership rushed to prepare a plan to comply with the court’s opinion, but, given the two-day timeframe, it was unable to put a plan to a vote or negotiate a mutually agreeable plan with the Governor. It submitted that plan to the court and the Governor for review on February 9. On February 19, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted its own plan. The parties to the litigation had never before seen the court’s plan and had no opportunity to vet for compliance with the court’s own criteria. 

By promulgating mandatory criteria the General Assembly could not anticipate in 2011, and that are found nowhere in the Pennsylvania Constitution, withholding guidance as to how to achieve compliance with Pennsylvania law until two days before the court’s imposed deadline to enact a new plan, creating a proportional-representation criterion that is practically impossible to implement, and imposing a remedial plan that had been in the works all along, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ensured that its desired plan to draft the new map would be successful.  

Organizations such as the American Civil Rights Union filed non-partisan maps with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but of course the court was not interested in a map that was not drawn by its hand-picked expert.

Justice Alito requested a response to the application by 3:00 PM Eastern on Monday.  We can expect a decision soon, as he denied the application to stay following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's initial order 10 days after the application was filed.

Oral Argument Highlights from Janus v. AFSCME

Today, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in Janus v. AFSCME, a First Amendment challenge to an Illinois statute requiring non-union members to pay mandatory union dues to the union deemed to represent the non-members' interests in collective bargaining activities. 

RNLA Advisory Council member Robert Alt described an irony at the heart of this compelled speech case:

What is surprising is the fact that Mark Janus is personally funding a cadre of high-priced lawyers with one goal: making sure that Mark loses his case. Why would he pay for the lawyers arguing against him? Because he has no choice. Mark is required to pay agency fees to the union, which are used for chargeable expenses like litigation, or he can be fired. And, of course, he is required to pay for political collective bargaining speech, or he can be fired. 

This is the real story of the money behind the Janus case—a story of forced contributions for political speech. But the story could have a happy ending. The Supreme Court will hear arguments today in a case that could vindicate the First Amendment rights of millions of Americans like Mark Janus. For Rebecca Friedrichs, for Mark Janus, and for all the workers who are being denied a voice and a choice, let’s hope that the second time is the charm.

Mr. Alt referenced Rebecca Friedrichs, the challenger in the 2016 case that raised the same issue and on which the Supreme Court deadlocked after Justice Scalia passed away a few weeks after oral arguments.  

RNLA member Ray LaJeunesse, Jr., summarized the history of compulsory union fees cases at the Supreme Court and gave some highlights of today's oral argument in a Federalist Society teleforum this afternoon:

• Ruling for Janus requires overturning Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, where Justice Powell concurred in the judgment but identified two flaws in the majority opinion that are at heart of Janus argument.
• Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson required that employees must be given adequate advanced notice of fees and basis.
• Knox v. SEIU (2012) – SEIU local imposed special assessment to oppose two ballot measures after Hudson notice sent; Supreme Court held additional notice must be sent and no fee could be imposed on non-members without their consent; compulsory subsidies for private speech are subject to exacting scrutiny; free-rider arguments insufficient to overcome First Amendment objections.
• Harris v. Quinn (2014) – majority refused to extend Abood because analysis was questionable on 6 grounds.
• Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association (2016) – directly presented question of whether Abood should be overruled and it was expected to be before Justice Scalia passed away; same question presented as in Janus.
• In Citizens United, Court held it does not hesitate to overrule decisions offensive to the First Amendment.  
• Assuming monopoly bargaining is a compelling government interest, forced agency fees are not required to achieve that interest as such bargaining occurs at the federal level and in right to work states without forced fees.  Respondents argued that forced fees are not subject to heightened scrutiny.
• There were competing demonstrations outside the Supreme Court.  It was the longest line of attorneys Mr. LaJeunesse had ever seen to get in to a case - over 100 in line and he was number 77 in the overflow room.
• National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation attorney Bill Messenger, arguing for Mr. Janus, was 42 seconds into his argument before Justice Ginsburg asked the first question, about mandatory student fees, bar fees, and private-sector unions.  Court in Harris distinguished all those scenarios (imposed for university’s interest in neutral forum for exchange of ideas, governmental regulation of practice of law, and private-sector bargaining is not political like public-sector bargaining).
• Justice Breyer asked about stare decisis, private-sector bargaining distinction, and Prof. Charles Fried's amicus brief that proposed compromise of different test for what is chargeable in public sector (charge only for union's statutory duties); Justice Alito pointed out compromise was not a solution because legislature could make union monopoly for purposes of lobbying, which California already has done.
• Solicitor General Noel Francisco argued that monopoly bargaining works without force fees at the federal government and postal service.  Justice Kagan asked how many times Trump Admin has switched its position at Supreme Court in this and other cases; he said 3 times (had faced question in other cases and appeared prepared for it).
• Illinois Solicitor General David Franklin was questioned closely by Justices Alito and Kennedy, both or whom clearly still ascribe to their opinion in Harris.  Justice Roberts asked whether it would make unions more responsive if they had to attract voluntary support (indicates his continued support for Harris opinion as well).  Justice Breyer brought up Prof. Fried's potential compromise again.
• Appellate lawyer David Frederick argued for the union and was again questioned closely by Justices Alito and Kennedy.  Justice Kennedy asked if this case would affect the political influence of unions if the Court rules for Janus, Frederick said “yes,” and Kennedy said, isn’t that the end of the case?  Justice Roberts asked how union negotiations over a collective bargaining agreement not affect state budget?  Mr. Frederick answered that they do.
• Mr. Frederick said there is real reliance here because there is a trade-off of agreeing not to strike in the collective bargaining agreement.  Mr. Messenger in rebuttal said that in other words, the scheme is racket protection, paying the union to ensure lack of uprising against the government and that grievance processing to enforce public policy according to the collective bargaining agreement is as much advocacy as making the agreement.
• Throughout the arguments, Justices Breyer and Kennedy were most active questioners.  Notably, Justice Gorsuch did not ask any questions.

The oral argument transcript is here.  While this case may be released at the end of the term like many other important cases are, Mr. LaJeunesse noted that opinions may have already been drafted and circulated for the Friedrichs case and the lines for all of the justices except Justice Gorsuch were already drawn in Harris, which might expedite the release of the decision.  This case will have serious implications for the free speech rights of public employees and their importance constitutional right against compelled speech.

Supreme Court: More Free Speech, Not Less

Yesterday, the Supreme Court handed down another opinion as it winds down its 2016 Term. The opinion issued today was Matal v. Tam, also known as "The Slants" case. The crux of this case was whether the U.S. Government could withhold trademark protection from words or terms that could offend society, in the opinion of government bureaucrats. Resoundingly, the Court declared, "No!" in an 8-0 decision. Both wings of the Court met at the middle, albeit emphasizing different means to get there.

Justice Alito authored the opinion of the Court, which was joined by the conservatives members of the Court. He stated:

[The idea that the government may restrict] speech expressing ideas that offend … strikes at the heart of the First Amendment. Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express “the thought that we hate.” 

We have said time and again that “the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their hearers.” Street v. New York, 394 U. S. 576, 592 (1969). See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U. S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”) [more cases omitted] …

Justice Kennedy authored a separate concurrence, which the liberal members of the Court signed on to as well:

A law found to discriminate based on viewpoint is an “egregious form of content discrimination,” which is “presumptively unconstitutional.” …  

A law that can be directed against speech found offensive to some portion of the public can be turned against minority and dissenting views to the detriment of all. The First Amendment does not entrust that power to the government’s benevolence. Instead, our reliance must be on the substantial safeguards of free and open discussion in a democratic society.

Here, both wings of the Court arrived at the same end: more free speech is better than less; the "Good" will drown out the "Bad."

However, in the state of play, the left is working to silence multiple viewpoints before they can even be heard. Case in point: the left's disparaging comments about Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity before the commission has even been convened. Allow the commission to do it job and assess the situation--then, there can be a true and free debate about the findings.